Sunday, 17 February 2013

A Mid Staffs case that illustrates a bigger challenge

Following the Francis Report into Mid Staffs  The Health and safety Executive are finally taking up a specific case. as reported here in the Telegraph http://t.co/kv2gRw2F
This case was the focus of a great deal of attention at the PI. To me it illustrates perfectly why it is really innapropriate to place blame on individuals in the front line.  I have heard from clinicians unconnected to Mid Staffs about the scale of the central problem in this case nationally. It is estimated that around 600 people die annually because they did not get their insulin on time.

I have transcribed a twitter converstaion with a nurse in which I tried to understand how this can happen, especially on an understaffed or underskilled ward.

The case is one of the two major test cases explored by the Francis inquiry into Mid Staffs. It is a distressing case of a very elderly lady with a complex mix of medical conditions in addition to dementia, who may have died because of failure to administer insulin at the correct intervals. 


I wanted to understand a little more about how insulin should normally be administered and why that could potentially fail.

This twitter conversation with a very experienced nurse (not from Stafford) answered many of my questions.

 Nurse: Neglected: The Lessons of Fatal Error in NHS Care - Home News - UK - The Independent
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/neglected-lessons-of-fatal-error-in-nhs-care-8468873.html

Diana: This case was one of the two main cases explored by the Francis inquiry. There were clear issues with drug handling


 Nurse: When diabetic patients are hospitalized prescribing their insulin is dependent on stability of their blood sugars

 Diana: What are you saying? Do you mean that their other condition can cause greater than normal variation in levels in Blood sugar?

 Nurse: Illness frequently causes fluctuating blood sugars - therefore it quite common for hospitalised diabetics to have their insulin prescribed via a sliding scale where insulin dosage is dependent on the blood sugar level.

 Many hospitalised diabetics will have their insulin prescribed at their normal intervals.

 Hospital may agree to allow patients to medicate themselves Patients who self medicate their insulin while hospitalised are patients who will not be compromised by doing so

 Diana: This lady was certainly unable to self med. Probably insulin unstable. (complex comorbidities) very unwell.

 Nurse: patients with unstable blood sugars will have their insulin prescribed -on sliding scale regime --- frequent testing for Blood Sugar & dosage of insulin prescribed is dependent on BS

 Diana: How long does it take to test Blood sugar, calculate dose & Administer

 Nurse: using BM machine (blood sugar testing kit) I would say 5 minutes from arriving at patients bed to giving insulin

 Diana: which is quite a chunk of time - if ward is not well staffed. How often do you need to test?

 Nurse: patients with unstable BS on sliding scale maybe require BS every 30mins / hourly /every 2 ,3 ,4 hourly

 Diana: Every 30 minutes! good god - no wonder this is a problem -so 6 unstable patients needs 1 nurse just for this

 Nurse: when giving insulin so frequently the reason for regular checking is to ensure the insulin doesn't lower BS below safe levels

 Diana: if patient was asleep when test due would it be normal to wake them or wait? -

 Nurse: if these patients are sleeping when due BS check then I would waken them - their BS are unpredictably unstable. That 30 min checking is usually not for lengthy periods - if a patient is very ill the sliding scale prescribing method can continue for days but these are patients who very ill with problem aside from diabetes

 Diana: back to the lady - she was very ill - about 5 conditions. but can now see how testing regime could slip. would guess that the Birmingham prompt system, (Birmingham university hospital have developed a prompt system to remind clinical staff if tests or doses are overdue) might help to ensure either regular doses or regular testing. I think the challenge may be to ensure that care that would always occur in best well run wards is possible across the board.

 Nurse: unless you have experienced the sense of chaos that under staffing can cause -you would be unable to understand

 Another Tweeter: I did yesterday, people throwing up in corridors and waiting rooms. Not enough staff

 Diana I think I can understand. - have seen the chaos my confused mother brought to understaffed wards -

 Nurse: Sliding scale regime for insulin prescribing is time consuming if there are numerous other patients

 Diana: Thank you for you patient explanation – I feel I understand what actually will have happened in this case a little better now. The Francis report will bring a lot of criticism of nursing staff, but I think it is important to understand something of why things can sometimes go wrong..

 Nurse: Francis report will be soon upon us and we have to face every single fact criticism that it contains. We have to be accountable and learn huge lessons to prevent further patient neglect ever again, but there is a side show - irresponsible- media Government - we have to find way not to damn all nurses otherwise care will be affected as it becomes harder to recruit nurses and the best ones leave

 Nurse: NHS being hammered and there are so many excellent nurses just thinking .- whats the point

 Diana: Hang in there - we need you!

 Nurse: wasn't referring to me - there are nurses in NHS & their expertise commitment is never acknowledged but when the attack is relentless - it can zap all the zeal & enthusiasm you once had. We don't want acclaim. We don’t want to be seen as unable to deal with criticism, We know the challenge ahead

Tuesday, 20 March 2012

The Health Bill: A perspective on risk from Mid Staffs.

What risks do the Health and Social Care bill pose to the Health system: A perspective from Mid Staffs




As we reach the end of the troubled progress of the Health bill through the parliamentary system,  the call is to wait for the risk register, so that we can see the potential risks that professionals have identified if the Health Bill goes forward.
Whilst Labour, many health professionals and a growing number of the public would like this risk register to be published before the health bill is passed, the Government continues to resist this request.
In the absence of this register I am tempted to note down some of the risks that I see from the perspective of someone who has spent nine months watching the Mid Staffs inquiry.
For me, the risk register is important, but perhaps less important than waiting another few months so that all of us can get the benefit of the many millions of pounds of tax payers money spent on the Mid Staffs Inquiry, which will I believe give us, if we have the patience to wait, a solid basis for debating the reforms that the NHS actually needs.
Some of the risks that I am picking up here may be less to do with the changes that the bill may bring than they are to do with changes being triggered by the NHS response to Mid Staffs, and to the £20bn cuts.
I believe that when Andrew Lansley called for the Public inquiry at Mid Staffs he would quite simply have expected the Inquiry to prove his case for health reform. When we see the report from Mid Staffs and the challenges that it raises I think we may find that the Health Bill is taking us in the wrong direction. 
One of the big gaps for me at the Inquiry is that we did not hear from Andrew Lansley, so we did not hear what his assumptions were, or what he knew or did not know. We do not know to what extent his plans for health reform were based on assumptions he made about what had happened at Mid Staffs.

Basic assumptions about Mid Staffs
The assumptions made by the press and media is that there was a catastrophic failure at Stafford, something quite out of the ordinary, and that the different tiers of management and the regulators all failed to spot this. The press assumes that there were very high numbers of “excess deaths” at Stafford. The numbers 400-1200 are still regularly quoted, and that therefore the failure of anyone to notice this must mean that there was a total system failure.
A key witness to the inquiry made the statement that there was “no mortality problem at Mid Staffs”. This assertion is well supported by the evidence given under oath by many different witnesses. For the assertion of large numbers of “excess deaths” to be true it would require large numbers of people to have lied under oath or to be self deceived.  

Risks: The assumption that Mid Staffs demonstrates the Health service is broken and that there was a total system failure may be ill founded.


What did Andrew Lansely assume?
 We do not know what Andrew Lansley believes about this.  If Stafford is the justification for his plans to scrap the PCTs and SHAs then there may be serious questions about the entire basis of the bill.

Risks: The assumption that the PCTs and SHAs fundamentally failed and are expendable may be wrong. They may actually be performing an essential function.


The effects of Structural re-organisation
What the Inquiry does show us very clearly is that structural re-organisation puts the NHS under real pressure. There were real problems for Stafford.  The period investigated by the inquiry showed us re-organisation of the PCTs, the SHA, the Regulator, The Hospital board, and the process of becoming a foundation trust, together with changes of a number of key personnel.  These re-organisations brought with them major disruption of the communication networks and meant that key information was not being shared effectively across a range of different organisations.  It meant that at times the hospital needed support that support was not available to it. All of this also occurred at a time that the NHS was being pressed to make financial cut backs. 

Risks: Major disruption is caused by structural Re-organisation. Especially at a time of financial cut backs.  These conditions are being created throughout the health service now.


Weaknesses of local scrutiny bodies
The inquiry also clearly shows us the weakness of a number of different local bodies with a responsibility for the hospital. The Foundation trust board was not well equipped to be able to ask the right questions.  The Scrutiny committees did not scrutinize, effectively, though their basic assumptions about the hospital may have been essentially correct.  LINks  was new, and unformed. It never acted as intended and found itself unsettled by the hospital protest group that sought to use it as a vehicle for their concerns.  The GPs had no methods of collating or sharing concerns, and clearly never saw it as their role to act as scrutinizers of local health services.

Risks: It may be unsafe to assume that elected, selected or voluntary local bodies have the necessary skills or experience to be able to be able to replace professional health managers in overseeing the running of the health service.  The evidence that GPs are willing or able to perform this role is not found in the Mid Staffs Inquiry.


The effect of Cost improvement programs, financially driven targets, and pressures of being a Foundation Trust.
The Inquiry evidence seems to indicate that many of the problems that were experienced by Mid Staffs occurred during a period when Cost improvement programs were being imposed on hospitals throughout the country, and when they also needed to meet targets in order to ensure that they maximised their income.  The pressure on both of these aspects was intensified because the hospital was expected to become a foundation trust.  Most of the failings that did occur in Mid Staffs can be attributed to these pressures.

Risks: CIPs, Targets as an essential part of maximising income, and pressure to become a foundation trust are all part of the existing pressures on hospitals.  These conditions are currently being re-created throughout the country.


Early attempt at Integration
The main approaches to the CIP were to cut back office staff, and to move towards integration. The intention was that people would stay for less long in hospital and that more care would be provided in the community.   In practice both of these approaches led to major difficulty.

Risks: Cuts to back office staff can result in failure on essential administrative tasks that can seriously affect the performance of a hospital.  Integration and speedy discharge of patients into the community can only work if the community based services exist.  


Knock on effects when integration fails.
The impact of the failure of this early attempt at integration was major. Because the hospital cut bed and staff, but did not have the means to discharge patients into the community, the pressure on bed spaces mounted, and backed up into the A&E.  A&E waits increased, leading to problems with meeting targets. Work arounds were established including the use of Clinical decision units (which were essentially waiting bays for admission to wards or to social care beds) and the pressure on A&E staff increased to unacceptable levels, leading to staff sickness, breakdown in morale, short staffing and an increased chance of error.

Risks:  If “Integration” is not implemented effectively this can have a serious effect on the quality and safety of the service.  Integration as a means of reducing cost of NHS is being tried all over the country. In many cases the structures to make this work do not exist.


The conditions for creating successful integration.
Integration requires Primary, Secondary and Social care, to work together, often with the involvement of voluntary organisations and with the co-operation of families.  This is not an easy task.  It is a task that would have been overseen by the PCTs and SHAs.

Risk : May be difficult for the CCGs to take the strategic position necessary to co-ordinate integrated care. It may be difficult to make combine this with providing opportunities for competing organisations.


Patient choice as a driver of quality.
Once Mid Staffs became a foundation trust, the pressures of financially breaking even which was always going to be challenging, meant that patient choice, and reputation assumed a new importance. This reduced the willingness of the organisation to be as open as it should have been. It also made the hospital extremely vulnerable to attacks through the media, and this became a massive problem.  The complaints process failed when relationships between key individuals broke down. This then spilt into the media. The resulting damage to reputation had a knock on effect on recruitment which has led to the current threat to the A&E service.  This may illustrate that Choice is unpredictable and may not be the best mechanism for regulating a system that fits the needs of the population.

Risk: In a system dominated by choice and competition managing PR and media management will become major pre-occupations for health organisations.  There will need to be adequate protection against ill founded criticism, which could make essential organisations financially unviable. 


Basic Care of the Elderly: The pressure for early discharge > Dilnot. 
The biggest criticisms made of Mid Staffs, which were re-enforced by the Robert Francis Independent inquiry, is that basic care of the elderly was not as good as it should have been. A series of other reports conducted since 2010 have shown that this is not a matter restricted to Mid Staffs, it is widespread.  The response that the Health service is making to this, in the context of the £20bn cuts, is to look at ways of reducing the amount of time the elderly spend in hospital. The Hospitals are increasingly being regarded as for acute care only.  As yet the alternatives to Hospital care are not in place, and social care budgets have been cut. There are increasing numbers of stories of the pressures being caused to families by early discharge.  What no one is openly discussing so far is the fact that for many families the cost of care will pass from free health care to means tested social care, when it is available, or to the best the family can afford if it is not. There is no commitment yet to implementing Dilnot, which is essential to make these major changes fair and affordable.  

Risk: The public are not yet aware of the financial implications for families of reducing the role of Hospitals to acute care only.


Regulation of the quality of care
One of the major themes of the Mid staffs inquiry was the difficulty of regulating the quality of care. When it comes to hospitals there have in fact been major improvements in measuring outcomes since 2007, made in part because of concerns within the NHS to the limitations of the systems that triggered the Mid Staffs scandal.  There are however still real difficulties in measuring quality of basic care in care homes, or particularly in domiciliary care. These are the sectors where more care of the most vulnerable will be carried out.

Risk:  Regulation of quality of care in Homes and in domiciliary care is problematic, and nationally we will be relying on these services to a much greater degree. 


Staffing levels & Staffing mix
One of the identified problems in Mid staffs was that there was an unusual staffing mix, with more Care staff to Nursing staff than is usual.  The staffing levels were also sub optimal. It was recognised that Care staff receive less training and are not registered in the same way as nursing staff, and that it is therefore far harder to control the quality of their work. The DoH has so far refused to set guidelines on staffing levels or staffing mix, and it is also resisting the call to register Care staff.  This resistance may be in part because of the unwillingness of the private sector to embrace clear guidelines on staffing.
The realities of how domiciliary care staff work, often with people with dementia who would find making complaints difficult or impossible, means that the only real guarantee about the quality of service is through staff training, status and reputation.  The Bill looks unlikely to foster the improved status of staff.

Risk:  Private sector companies providing care will have no incentive to register, train, or pay care staff in a way likely to improve their status or the quality of their work. Patient choice becomes meaningless when dealing with very vulnerable patients who are in no position to choose.


Patient Complaints
Patient complaints. The Mid Staffs story is essentially about trying to find an effective way to ensure that patients feel their complaints are listened to, understood and acted on, and that the general public can feel satisfied that the complaints of an individual have been dealt with in a fair and appropriate manner.  This is by no means a simple matter. It is presumably Andrew Lansley’s intention that any future complaints within the NHS remain a strictly local matter and are not “visited upon” the Secretary of State for health.

Risk: It is unclear that the current proposals on hearing and resolving health and social care complaints are sufficiently robust


A wider role for the patient voice.
Beyond complaints there is a real role for patients to play in helping to drive the incremental improvements required in Health care. There have been significant improvements in capturing the patient voice, made by the NHS in response to the questions raised by Mid Staffs.  
The bodies which were proposed by the Health Bill initiailly to give patients a stronger voice appear now to be on hold. It is unclear why that has happened.   

Risk: Why are bodies to increase the effectiveness of the patient voice no longer part of the bill?


Democratic control. – Accountability.
The Mid Staffs board operated behind closed doors in the period leading up to the problems. It now operates a very open process with the public present in some numbers at the board meetings and with regular question and answer sessions for the public. 

Risks: The CCGs will be in a position of having to make difficult and potentially very unpopular decisions. It is not clear what provision there is to make these bodies fully accountable to the public, or if the local councillors will have the necessary skills, time or inclination to carry out an adequate scrutiny role.


The Role of the press.
Much has been made in the press of the fact that the press were the key players in uncovering and exposing the problems at Mid Staffs, which they clearly feel to have been a matter of public interest.  The day to day coverage of the story and of the inquiry created a high level of local interest and will have increased sales of local papers.  Now that that has died down the papers are perhaps more dependent on advertising revenue to keep them solvent in what is an increasingly hostile climate for local papers.  The New Private sector health providers that are emerging, and also the new level of interest in PR from the NHS providers are all a useful source of advertising revenue for the press. There is some evidence that this could have an effect on the way in which papers might choose to report or not to report issues affecting their advertisers.

Risk:  Patient choice is largely driven by “what the papers say”. Can we rely on the press to be impartial?


Choice – variability
What the public need is a stable service based on need. It is not clear that this can be driven by choice or the market. The story of Mid Staffs shows that choice can easily be distorted. High levels of press interest can have a major effect on an organisation, creating real problems.  

The public reaction to the part time closure, and threat of downgrading of A&E caused by these problems is interesting, as though the public had gone through a period of real concern about the hospital, prompted by the press interest, when it became clear that their services were under threat there was a massive ground swell of support for the hospital with thousands of the public signing a petition to re-open the A&E.  

Risks: Patient Choice is volatile. It can be affected by poor quality evidence and it may not reflect what is needed.


The role of the Unions
One of the key witnesses from one of the union made the point that in Mid Staffs the unions had been tolerated rather than encouraged. The unions were weak, and though they did hear of some concerns about the level of staffing and the degree of pressure that staff were experiencing because of this they did not manage to raise these effectively.  If staff had felt more able to raise concerns clearly is likely that many of the issues raised by the failure of the early attempts at integration would have been identified at a much earlier stage.

Risks:  The rise of the use of private sector organisations in health care is likely to lead to weaker union representation, lower job security and an increased reluctance on the part of staff to speak out when they encounter problems.


Is Control the right way to a better workforce
Andrew Lansley has often indicated that he believes that the NHS is broken, and needs radical surgery to fix it.  The Health bill appears to make the assumption that the best way of getting a better NHS is to have more control over the workforce. Some of the thinking from people who support the bill is expressed in very mechanistic ways. We have blue print thinking – exact safety protocols, which if followed to the letter will produce safe results. There is an assumption that if staff do not follow procedures to the letter then there should be easy ways of getting rid of them.
My concerns about all of this is that there is a basic misunderstanding of what health care is. Health care is about people and relationships. It is about the quality of communication and finding the ways to assist patients to become partners in their own care choices.
The major – no doubt unintended consequence - of the troubled passage of the health bill is that the Government now finds itself seen as the enemy of many health professionals, who believe that the government simply fails to understand the profession.  The rhetoric of “liberating the NHS” is simply not the way in which the NHS workforce are experiencing the Health Bill.  

Risk:  The difficult relationships that now exist between the government and the health professions will need to be cured in order to meet the objectives of the government. This will entail coming to a better understanding of the needs of the workforce.


Ways forward.
The Bill is a mess. Relationships between government and the Health profession are a mess.  The structures to replace the professional managers removed from the NHS do not exist. Local bodies will struggle to replace these. The upheaval caused by the bill will have a major detrimental effect on health provision. Morale amongst Health professionals is low and many key people will leave the profession.
The Government cannot deliver any of these changes without the willing help of the professions. This cannot be forced. There is an urgent need to work towards better understanding.
The Mid Staffs inquiry report will provide useful starting points for the dialogue on evidence based reform which now needs to take place.   

Monday, 5 March 2012

The Francis Report

The Francis report

Because the protest group, Bill Cash, and the press remained unsatisfied with the HCC report, the Colin Thome report, The Alberti report and the Case Note review, there was continued pressure for a public Inquiry. This was resisted by Alan Johnson, but when Andy Burnham took over as SoS David Kidney was able to persuade him of the need for an Independent inquiry.
The Francis report heard detailed evidence from many patients and relatives and from some staff. Many people felt able to take part in this because it was not conducted in public, and the evidence that was collected was very powerful.
What was immediately apparent to anyone reading this report is that the focus of problems was not on some disastrous breakdown of medical care or widespread medical accidents, it was about basic nursing. It begins with a graphic chapter on continence, and goes on to look at a range of dignity and comfort issues that have since become familiar to us with numerous reports conducted throughout the country.
These are distressing problems. They are also very familiar to people who have had any dealings with hospitals or care homes over the last few decades.
Robert Francis also clearly identified that the excess death figures were unsafe, He gave introductory details of the major disagreements between the proponents of different statistical systems for measuring mortality and he recommended a major review of the way in which mortality statistics are collected.
Robert Francis recommendations have been taken seriously by the health profession, and much quiet careful work has been going on to address these problems.
It is unlikely that Structural reform of the health service has much to offer, and it is also unlikely that there are any magical solutions on offer. The problems are deep seated. They are about our willingness to pay for the care we all need, and about some of the attitudes to the elderly and vulnerable that permeate our society.

The Case Note Review

The Case Note review.

There was  widespread public concern, and many people who had lost relatives needed reassurance. Alan Johnson arranged for a case note review which was set up to allow families to go through case notes with a specialist, to find out what they could see about the deaths.
It had been anticipated that this exercise might give an indication of the true number of “unnecessary deaths”, but the Doctor assigned to this task makes it clear that this was not possible. After a lot of press coverage designed to reach as many people as possible around 120 people eventually came forward for this service.
Some of these were people who had lost family members In difficult circumstances as much as 10 years previously.
He are my impressions of the Evidence given to the Inquiry.
Tom Kark notes in his final submission that the Dr was asked the question how many of these cases were people were excess deaths. He thought that there was a possibility that one may have been.

Reports by David Colin Thome and Professor George Alberti

Reports by David Colin Thome and Professor George Alberti
Alan Johnson as soon as the Health Care commission report was released Commissioned reports from David Colin Thome and Professor George Alberti These were completed promptly.
Alberti  laid out the simple steps that were needed to solve the problems of A&E and the acute wards in the hospital. David Colin Thome looked at the weaknesses in the regulatory systems.  David Colin Thome also provided the first official confirmation that the excess death figures should not be taken as fact 
He describes

Both the SHA and PCT state that they first detected problems in patient care from the 2007 Hospital Standardised Mortality Rate (HSMR) data. HSMR data has featured prominently in the Mid Staffordshire investigation and prompted much ill informed speculation and comment as to suppose excess deaths at the hospital.
HSMR data is not a measure accurate enough to be used as an absolute indicator of quality and safety, but like all indicators, it is one measure, and can indicate a problem. No one data source is sufficient to provide the full picture of an organisation, and triangulation of data is key.


I have written a number of letters to the local press on the matter over the last three years, but this is the only means by which local people may have begun to question the accepted stories.

There was a public meeting for the public to hear from Alberti & Colin Thome about their findings.

 There was a question from the floor regarding the supposed excess deaths, and Colin Thome explained that these figures could not be relied on. This was then immediately denied by the pressure group, who clearly believed that they were better informed than Sir David Colin Thome.
Dr David Colin Thomes report is brief – but clearly identifies many of the themes concerning regulation and governance that have been developed by the Public Inquiry.

The public meeting in Stafford.

Looking back at April 2009
The public meeting in Stafford.
In Stafford the Hospital story dominated the press day after day, and public concern was reaching boiling point. A public meeting was set up by the pressure group with the assistance of Bill Cash.
The purpose of this was to put individuals who felt that they might have a claim against the hospital  in touch with a number of legal companies who were offering to represent their interests.
The Lawyers were given time at the meeting to explain what they could offer, and then had opportunities to meet with their potential clients over coffee.
The other two local MPs also attended this meeting and I and a number of other people went along as an observer.
There were around 100 people there, many of whom were genuinely angry with the hospital and had stories to tell. Many of these are people I have never seen since, though we should presume that they were involved in the group compensation claim made against the hospital  The core pressure group of people with serious committment to dealing with their concerns has dwindled to around 15.
The pressure group and Bill Cash were of course using this meeting to reiterate their call for a Public Inquiry, which David Kidney also felt was necessary. Tony Wright explained why he felt this was the wrong course to take.
I found the meeting shocking. I still do. Perhaps it was just the excitement of the occasion, but Julie Bailey used the platform to call “lets shut the hospital, lets sack all the staff”. This was met by loud cheers from her band of followers.
Her anger as an individual is something that is completely understandable in human terms.
What concerned me was the toxic nature of the politics which meant that one party appeared to be willing to stimulate and ride public anger in this way. If politicians behave like this then essential trust is eroded and it becomes impossible to work together, to solve the difficult problems that face us all.

The Broken Health Service

The Broken Health service story spreads.
When the story was confined to Stafford, it alienated the hospital staff who best understood what had really happened
When the HCC report was published in the middle of international media frenzy this had the same effect nationally as it had done in Stafford. People read the stories and felt that they had experienced something similar. The level of complaints soared. The Patients association which had been running with a staff of two and a half volunteers, needed to increase its numbers to six. Well respected organisations like Age Concern and the Alzheimers society recognised that issues for which they had been trying to attract attention for decades were now in the public eye, and important reports were commissioned to look at the real shortcomings in the way we care for the frail elderly. These are continuing. This latest one looks at the issue of Dignity in care.
Some of this recognised the scale of the challenge presented by our growing elderly population, Some of it was presented as criticism of a failing nursing profession. As the simplistic criticism of the health service grew, with wdespread media criticism of uncaring nurses who were too posh to wash,  this gradually drew the Conservative front bench into a hostile relationship with the NHS.
David Cameron visits Stafford.
One of the first public events that David Cameron was involved in following the tragic death of his son was a visit to Julie Baileys cafĂ© to meet with the grieving relatives. A flavour of that visit can be found here  
I personally found that visit a shock.  He was coming to a town that was in a highly volatile state. Up until that time I had no difficulty in accepting the widely help public perception of a courteous and caring young man. I had genuinely expected a statesmanlike attempt to calm public emotion, We did not get that. He stoked the fire, and the papers the next day included his angry response to the suggestion that he was using Stafford Hospital as a political football.
David Cameron was riding high in the polls then. His intervention, and the fact that we were into a pre- election period meant that tackling the essential misconception about Stafford became even harder than it had been. Any attempt to put the problems of Stafford into context was seem as an attack on the integrity of the pressure group, and as being “in denial”.
The stories of Stafford, as told in the press had now become "fact" that no-one was permitted to deny.